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BORDER SEARCH EXCEPTION HELD
INAPPLICABLE TO INTERNATIONAL LETTER MAIL
United States v. Ramsey, 538 F.2d 415 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
Holding that customs officials cannot search international letter mail'
without a warrant,2 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
has created a sharp split among the circuits concerning the proper scope
of the border search exception. 3
A customs inspector suspected that several envelopes contained
narcotics because they were bulky, unusually heavy, and from Thai-
land, a known source of heroin.4  Acting without a warrant, the
inspector opened the letters and found heroin.8 He then resealed the
envelopes and sent them to Washington, D.C., for controlled delivery
to the defendants, who were arrested with the letters in their posses-
sion.' The trial court found the warrantless search constitutional and
denied defendants' motion to suppress.7 Defendants were convicted
of illegal importation and possession of heroin." The Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed and held: The first
and fourth amendments prohibit warrantless searches of international
letter mail.9
1. The court gave no precise definition of "international letter mail." Postal
regulations currently limit "international letter class mail" to pieces weighing not more
than four pounds and not exceeding specified dimensions. 39 C.F.R. §§ 22.1(b), (c) (1)
(1975), quoted in United States v. Ramsey, 538 F.2d 415, 419 n.6 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
granted, 97 S. Ct. 56 (1976). The court recognized that some portion of this category
might be "packages" for fourth amendment purposes, but assigned to the Government
the responsibility for precise definition. 538 F.2d at 419 n.6. In close cases a warrant
should be obtained. Id.
2. United States v. Ramsey, 538 F.2d 415 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct.
56 (1976).
3. United States v. Barclift, 514 F.2d 1073, 1074-75 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 842 (1975); United States v. Bolin, 514 F.2d 554, 557 (7th Cir. 1975);
United States v. Odland, 502 F.2d 148, 151 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1088
(1974). See also United States v. Francis, 487 F.2d 968 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 908 (1974).
4. United States v. Ramsey, 538 F.2d 415, 417 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 97
S. Ct. 56 (1976).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 4, United States v. Ramsey, 97 S. Ct. 56
(1976).
8. 538 F.2d at 416.
9. ld. at 421.
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The fourth amendment of the United States Constitution ° protects
all persons in the United States" from "unreasonable" searches by
government officials, and permits a neutral magistrate 2 to issue a
search warrant only on a showing of "probable cause."' 3  Warrantless
searches are "per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-
subject only to a few specifically established and well delineated ex-
ceptions."' 4  Evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment
is inadmissible in criminal prosecutions against the victim of the un-
reasonable search.15
One well-delineated exception to the warrant requirement is a
border search by a customs officer.'" The original authority for this
practice, a 1789 statute17 authorizing customs officials to search "mobile
subjects" without a warrant,18 predates the fourth amendment. Al-
though the enactment of the fourth amendment had been prompted by
the indiscriminate searches of British officials enforcing the customs,'0
10. U.S. CONST. amend. IV provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma-
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
11. The fourth amendment protects both American citizens and aliens residing in
the United States and, in certain situations, aliens residing abroad. See United States v.
Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 280 (2d Cir. 1974), noted in 88 HARv. L. REv. 813 (1975)
and 10 TuLsA L.J. 479 (1975).
12. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1963); Johnson v. United
States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1943).
13. See note 10 supra.
14. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). See Stoner v. California, 376
U.S. 483, 486 (1963); Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253, 261 (1960); Jones v. United
States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958).
15. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383
(1914); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
16. See, e.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 150 (1925); Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886); United States v. Glaziou, 402 F.2d 8, 12 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1121 (1969); King v. United States, 348 F.2d 814, 817-18
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 926 (1965); Note, In Search of the Border: Searches
Conducted By Federal Customs and Immigration Officers, 5 N.Y.U.J. INr'L L. & POL.
93 (1972); Note, Search and Seizure at the Border-The Border Search, 21 RuTGERs L.
REv. 513, 514-16 (1967).
17. Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 24, 1 Stat. 29, 43.
18. The statute described "mobile subjects" as "any goods, wares, or merchandize
subject to duty" located on a "ship or vessel." A search of a permanent structure still
required a warrant. The statute described a permanent structure as a "dwelling-house,
store, building or other place." Id.
19. See Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. .476, 481-82 (1965); Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616, 624-25 (1886); Note, Search and Seizure at the Border-The Border
Search, supra note 17.
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Congress continued to authorize border searches subsequent to adop-
tion of the Bill of Rights. 20  An 1866 statute expanded the power of
customs officials to conduct border searches,2" authorizing inspection
for dutiable merchandise of "any trunk or envelope" found on or about
a mobile subject. 2  The statute currently in force23 employs the same
language.24
Courts have offered five rationales for the border search exception
to the warrant requirement. First, Congress has historically permitted
warrantless customs searches.25 Second, international travelers expect
that they will be required to disclose their identity and the contents of
their belongings at the border.2 Third, the government's interest in
controlling traffic across its borders outweighs an individual's privacy
interests.27 Fourth, obtaining a search warrant for the huge volume
of traffic across the border would be impractical;2 and finally, it would
often be impossible to obtain a search warrant before a mobile subject
flees.2 9
The border search exception has undergone continual expansion,30
and has recently been applied unanimously to packages in international
mail."' This extension rests on several grounds: the volume of pack-
20. E.g., Act of March 3, 1815, ch. 94, § 2, 3 Stat. 231, 232.
21. Act of July 18, 1866, cl. 201, § 3, 14 Stat. 178.
22. Id.
23. 19 U.S.C. § 482 (1970).
24. See Act of July 18, 1866, ch. 201, § 3, 14 Stat. 178.
25. See materials cited in note 16 supra.
26. E.g., United States v. Sohnen, 298 F. Supp. 51, 55 (E.D.N.Y. 1969); see Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (discussing a two-part
test for reasonable expectation).
27. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925) (governmental interest
in national security); United States v. Mitchell, 525 F.2d 1275, 1279 (5th Cir. 1976)
(governmental interest in national security); Alexander v. United States, 352 F.2d 379,
382 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 977 (1966) (governmental interest in contraband
control). See also Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886) (governmental
interest in collection of import tax revenues); United States v. Odland, 502 F.2d 148,
150 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1088 (1974) (governmental interest in collection
of import tax revenues); The Atlantic, 68 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir. 1933) (governmental
interest in contraband control).
28. See, e.g., Morales v. United States, 378 F.2d 187, 190 (5th Cir. 1967); King v.
United States, 348 F.2d 814, 818 (9th Cir. 1965); United States v. Rodriguez, 195 F.
Supp. 513, 516 (S.D. Tex. 1960), aff'd, 292 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1961).
29. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925).
30. See, e.g., United States v. McDaniel, 463 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
413 U.S. 919 (1973); United States v. DeLeon, 462 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1972); United
States v. Glaziou, 402 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1121 (1969).
31. See United States v. Doe, 472 F.2d 982, 984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S.
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ages potentially containing contraband precludes requiring a search
warrant for every package;"2 the search of a package crossing a border
is indistinguishable from a search of an international traveler and his
baggage;33 and, several Treasury regulations specifically authorize these
searches.14  Some courts hold international letter mail the legal
equivalent of packages and permit a warrantless search of an enve-
lope;s5 others carefully distinguish the two.3 6
First class mail implicates two first amendment interests in addition
to the more general fourth amendment interest in privacy. The first
amendment obviously protects the right of self-expression. 7  The
Supreme Court has also found a constitutional right to receive informa-
tion."' Both of these interests are threatened when a person is aware
that his correspondence may be subjected to indiscriminate search; dis-
couraging self-expression also impedes information acquisition 09
969 (1973); United States v. Galvez, 465 F.2d 681, 687 (10th Cir. 1972); United States
v. Beckley, 335 F.2d 86, 88-89 (6th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 922 (1965);
United States v. Carpenter, 403 F. Supp. 361 (D. Mass. 1975); United States v. Swede,
326 F. Supp. 533, 535-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); United States v. Sohnen, 298 F. Supp. 51,
54-55 (E.D.N.Y. 1969); People v. Schatz, 66 Misc. 2d 381, 321 N.Y.S.2d 186 (Sup. Ct.
1971).
32. See United States v. Doe, 472 F.2d 982, 984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S.
969 (1973); United States v. Sohnen, 298 F. Supp. 51, 54 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
33. See United States v. Beckley, 335 F.2d 86, 89 (6th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380
U.S. 922 (1965); Note, The Customs Authority To Search Foreign Mail, 6 INT. L. &
POL. 91, 97 (1973).
34. 19 C.F.R. § 145.2 (1975), amending 19 C.F.R. § 145.2 (1973) (mail subject to
customs examination); 39 C.F.R. - 61.1 (1972) (what is subject to examination).
35. United States v. Doe, 472 F.2d 982 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 969
(1973); United States v. Beckley, 335 F.2d 86 (6th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S.
922 (1965).
36. See United States v. Swede, 326 F. Supp. 533 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), in which the
court said:
Inasmuch as the evidence adduced ... undisputedly demonstrated that the
envelope contained a quantity of powder ... and no evidence has been pro-
duced which even suggests that a letter or written communication was ever
placed or found inside the envelope, the Court must conclude ... that the
envelope addressed to the movant was a "package."
Id. at 535-36; United States v. Sohnen, 298 F. Supp. 51 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
37. See generally T. EmERsoN, THm SYsTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6-7
(1970); Sedler, Book Review, 80 YALE L.J. 1070, 1080 (1971).
38. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 96
S. Ct. 1817, 1823 (1976); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965); Lamont
v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S.
141, 143 (1943); Note, supra note 33 at 110. See generally Emerson, Legal Founda-
lions of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U.L.Q. 1.
39. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 423 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring)
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Moreover, the fourth amendment specifically prohibits unreasonable
searches of citizens' "papers. '40 Compliance with the warrant require-
ment is particularly important when fourth amendment privacy interests
coincide with first amendment expression interests.41
Without a warrant, government officials cannot open first class mail
envelopes travelling within the United States 42 except to determine the
address to which a letter may be delivered. 3 In light of the border
search exception, however, some courts have refused to extend such
protection to first class mail from abroad. 44  In United States v. Od-
land,4" the Seventh Circuit held that the United States Customs Bureau
may conduct warrantless searches of international letters. The court
relied on a Treasury regulation subjecting international mail to customs
inspection,'4 and reasoned that an envelope is indistinguishable from a
person or good that may be legally searched upon entering the United
States."7 In the handful of cases that have followed Odland, courts have
relied on similar reasoning,4 8 any of several Treasury regulations subject-
ing international mail to customs examination,49 a federal statute em-
powering customs officials to conduct warrantless border searches, 0
or a combination of the above."
(prisoners' out-going mail); cf. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 65 (1960); NAACP v.
Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958). Contra, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 575-
76 (1974) (prisoners' incoming mail can be searched without a warrant). See generally
Note, supra note 33. at 111-12.
40. See note 10 supra.
41. See, e.g., United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313-14
(1972); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965), cited in 538 F.2d at 420.
42. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877).
43. 39 U.S.C. § 3623(d) (1970) authorizes the opening of "dead letters":
No letter of such a class of domestic origin shall be opened except under
authority of a search warrant authorized by law, or by an officer or employee of
the Postal Service for the sole purpose of determining an address at which the
letter can be delivered, or pursuant to the authorization of the addressee.
44. United States v. Beckley, 335 F.2d 86, 88 (6th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S.
922 (1965). See notes 45-51 infra.
45. 502 F.2d 148 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1088 (1974).
46. The Treasury regulation provides: "All mail originating outside the customs
territory of the United States is subject to customs examination except [certain mail
addressed to diplomats, international organizations, and government officials]." 39
C.F.R. § 61.1 (1972).
47. 502 F.2d at 151.
48. Id. at 150-51.
49. 19 C.F.R. § 145.2 (1975), amending 19 C.F.R. § 145.2 (1973); 39 C.F.R. §
61.1 (1972) (see note 46 supra).
50. 19 U.S.C. § 482 (1970).
51. United States v. Milroy, 538 F.2d 1033 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S.
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In United States v. Ramsey,5 2 the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia acknowledged that the border search exception applies to
packages, but refused to extend it to international letter mail. 8 The
majority rejected the Government's argument that the mobility and
huge traffic in letters potentially containing contraband rendered the
warrant requirement impractical.5 4  First, letters have limited carrying
capacity and are far less likely to contain contraband than packages,
cars, or suitcases. 55  Second, screening techniques such as dogs,50
x-rays,5" or metal detectors, 8 which diminish the need for a physical
search,5" are more easily applied to letters than to persons or automo-
(1976); United States v. Bolin, 514 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Barclift,
514 F.2d 1073 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 842 (1975); Hogan v.
Nebraska, 402 F. Supp. 812 (D. Neb. 1975); United States v. Various Articles of
Obscene Merchandise, 395 F. Supp. 791 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); State v. Jennings, 32 Conn.
Supp. 15, 336 A.2d 237 (Super. Ct. 1974); People v. Tobiass, 69 Misc. 2d 700, 330
N.Y.S.2d 824 (Rockland County Ct. 1972). See also United States v. King, 517 F.2d
350 (5th Cir. 1975).
52. 538 F.2d 415 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 56 (1976).
53. Id. at 418-21.
54. Id. at 418. The Ramsey court also briefly considered and rejected two other
rationales for excepting international mail from the warrant requirement. The court
cited Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), to reject the theory that a "well-
established history of warrantless searches" justifies continuing the practice. 538 F.2d at
418 n.5. Judge Robb, in dissent, argued that Camara concerned administrative searches
and was therefore inapplicable to the customs search in the instant case. 538 F.2d at
523 n.1. Assuming the validity of the distinction, however, the history of the border
search exception establishes that warrantless searches of envelopes were only permissible
when found on a mobile subject. See notes 19-24 supra and accompanying text. The
Ramsey court also rejected the contention that warrants are not required because
international travelers expect their privacy to be invaded. The court thought this
argument largely circular, and in any event inapplicable to searches of letter class mail.
538 F.2d at 418 n.5.
55. 538 F.2d at 419. The court reasoned that only narcotics, small jewelry, precious
metals and currency would fit into an envelope.
56. Id., citing United States v. Mitchell, 525 F.2d 1275, 1277 (5th Cir. 1976),
United States v. Fulero, 498 F.2d 748, 749 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (per curiam), and United
States v. Feldman, 366 F. Supp. 356, 358 (D. Hawaii 1973). See also United States v.
Milroy, 538 F.2d 1033 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. - (1976). Contra, United
States v. Solis, 393 F. Supp. 325, 327 (C.D. Cal. 1975). See generally Note, Constitu-
tional Limitations on the Use of Canines to Detect Evidence of Crime, 44 FORDHAM L.
Rav. 973-90 (1975).
57. 538 F.2d at 419, citing United States v. Chiarito, 507 F.2d 1098, 1099 (5th
Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 824 (1975), and United States v. Sohnen, 298
F. Supp. 51, 53 (E.D.N.Y. 1969). See State v. Gallant, 308 A.2d 274, 276 (Me. 1973).
58. 538 F.2d at 419. See, e.g., United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 805-06 (2d
Cir. 1974); United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 770-72 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 947 (1972).
59. 538 F.2d at 419.
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biles. Finally, customs officials can detain letters more easily than
people, and have time to obtain a warrant if probable cause exists.60
The court rejected the contention that the warrant requirement would
constitute an unreasonable threat to effective law enforcement, noting
that officials in the District of Columbia obtained a search warrant
under similar circumstances.61
The crux of the Ramsey opinion, however, lay in the majority's judg-
ment that the need to protect the privacy and free expression interests
inherent in first class mail outweigh the administrative inconvenience
of acquiring a warrant."- Unlike packages or automobiles, letters are
"'as much a part of free speech as the right to use our tongues.' "63
Routine inspection of such letters, the court reasoned, would seriously
inhibit free expression. Consequently, the "especially strong" limits on
search and seizure when first and fourth amendment values coincide"4
require a warrant to validate the search of international letter mail.
The majority noted three additional values served by application
of the warrant requirement to international letter mail. First, subject-
ing search requests to the detached scrutiny of a neutral magistrate
would limit unjustified intrusions. 65 Second, the record made at that
time would ease the task of subsequent judicial review and reduce the
likelihood of subsequent fabrication of "probable cause" based on the
fruits of the search. 6 Finally, the warrant would assure that officials
search only letters reasonably suspected of containing contraband rather
than political or social beliefs with which the officers disagree.67
Judge Robb maintained in dissent that an envelope sent through the
mail is indistinguishable from one personally carried through customs.
Since the border search exception clearly permits a warrantless search
in the latter situation, it should also apply to the former.63 Moreover,
60. Id., citing United States v. Van Leeuwan, 397 U.S. 249 (1970). Accord, United
States v. Swede, 326 F. Supp. 533, 536 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); State v. Gallant, 308 A.2d 274,
278 (Me. 1973).
61. 538F.2d at 422.
62. Id. at 420.
63. Id., quoting United States ex rel. Milwaukee Social Democratic Publishing Co. v.
Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 437 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
64. 538 F.2d at 420, citing United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S.
297, 313-14 (1972), and Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965).
65. 538 F.2d at 421.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 421-22.
68. Id. at 423 (Robb, J., dissenting).
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even though packages might contain private writings, all courts agree
that they may be searched without a warrant.69
The majority's refusal to extend the border search exception to inter-
national letter mail is commendable. Warrantless searches are the
exception, not the rule.70 Accordingly, the Government had the burden
of proving the applicability of the border search exception to letter mail
and justifying a rule conflicting with that applied to first class mail
traveling within the United States. International letter mail implicates
the same first amendment interests as domestic first class mail. An
American citizen's interest in acquiring information from abroad is as
important as his ability to correspond with domestic sources. 71  The
argument that the sender's interests in self-expression and privacy
should not be protected because he may not be an American citizen
is unpersuasive."2 The reasons underlying the border search exception
are inapplicable to letters. 3
To protect these individual interests, the Government need not fore-
go its legitimate interest in excluding contraband from the country. Cus-
toms officials currently search less than one percent of all international
letter mail,"4 which suggests they would not be seriously handicapped
by the warrant requirement. Moreover, customs authorities have suc-
cessfully employed the screening techniques suggested in Ramsey to
obtain probable cause for a search warrant. 7r The inspector's suspicions
69. Id.
70. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1968); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
20 (1967); Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 631 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S.
Ct. 1685 (1976); Appellant Ramsey's Supplemental Brief at 1, United States v. Ramsey,
538 F.2d 415 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 56 (1976). See also Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 481 (1970).
71. Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965) (holding unconstitutional
routine interception of "communist political propaganda" from overseas unless addressee
specifically requested that he receive it); Mandel v. Mitchell, 325 F. Supp. 620, 631
(E.D.N.Y. 1971), rev'd on other grounds sub. nom. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753
(1972) (right of American citizens to hear alien defend his views is "the essence of self-
government"); Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U.L.Q.
1, 2-4, 7 (comprehensive theory of right to know necessary to vindicate these interests in
all cases).
72. See United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 280 (2d Cir 1974) (involving
fourth amendment rights of an alien living abroad, applicable to first amendment rights).
73. See notes 54-60 supra and accompanying text.
74. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 14, United States v. Ramsey, 97 S. Ct. 56
(1976).
75. See State v. Gallant, 308 A.2d 274 (Me. 1973).
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in Ramsey doubtless constituted probable cause.76 As the majority
noted,77 interposing a neutral magistrate's judgment is more likely to
dissuade arbitrary official action than to interfere with legitimate
searches.
The dissent's arguments are unpersuasive. A correspondent's ex-
pectation of privacy in a sealed envelope exceeds a traveler's at a port
of entry; the latter knows his effects are subject to search. Moreover,
the practical considerations that justify warrantless searches of the
traveller are largely inapplicable to letter mail. The contention that
packages may also contain writings protected by the first amendment
fails to address the majority's argument: letters are far more likely
to contain such material and less likely to contain contraband. 78
One possible flaw in the court's first amendment analysis was its
failure to discuss the legal categorization of intercepted "letters" that
contain no writing. Some courts characterize such "letters" as "pack-
ages" and automatically apply the border search exception.79 In the
event that customs officials could determine the absence of writing by
external examination, the Ramsey court's first amendment and privacy
concerns would evaporate, and a warrantless search would arguably be
permissible. Because the Government asserted that the border search
exception justified all routine inspection of international letter mail,
however, the court did not need to address this possibility.80 In any
event, a blanket rule requiring a warrant for letter mail is certainly the
easiest rule to apply and enforce.
On a more fundamental level, many authorities believe the warrant
procedure is futile because the "neutral magistrate" is in reality merely
a puppet who rubber stamps all warrants."' Under this view of the
warrant process, Ramsey will add only a time-consuming ceremony to
customs inspections, without protecting a correspondent's first and
fourth amendment interests. For obvious reasons courts have consist-
ently rejected this gloomy view of the warrant requirement. It consti-
tutes an attack upon the practical value of an explicit constitutional pro-
76. 538 F.2d at 421 n.8.
77. Id. at 421-22.
78. See notes 55, 63-64 supra and accompanying text.
79. See cases cited note 36 supra.
80. 538 F.2d at 418.
81. See W. LAFAvE, ARREST, THE DECISION To TAKE A SUsPEcr INTO CUSTODY, 15-
16, 502-04 (1965); L. TIFFANY, D. MCINTYaR JR., & D. ROThNmERG, DETEmnON OF
CRIME 119-20 (1967).
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vision, not its legal significance. If courts are at all faithful to the Con-
stitution, they must assume the operative value of procedures explicitly
required.
The well-reasoned opinion in Ramsey stands in marked contrast to
the decisions of the Courts of Appeals for the Seventh and Ninth Cir-
cuits. 82 As a result of the split among the circuits, a customs official
anticipating a prosecution in the District of Columbia must obtain a
search warrant before opening the same letter that he might legally
open if suit were expected in the Seventh or Ninth Circuits. The
Supreme Court should grant the Government's petition for certiorari in
Ramsey,83 and resolve this conflict by affirming the superior opinion
of the District of Columbia Circuit.
82. See note 3 supra.
83. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari, United States v. Ramsey, 97 S. Ct. 56 (1976).
As this issue went to press, the Supreme Court did grant certiorari. 97 S. Ct. 56 (1976).
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